#security
18 resources and 4 guides tagged #security on ChangeGamer.
- Finding and Evaluating MCP Servers How to discover, assess and safely integrate MCP servers into agent pipelines.
- Agentic Security Checklist Cross-vendor, threat-surface-organized security checklist for building and operating AI agents — synthesizing OWASP, NIST, Anthropic, OpenAI, Google SAIF, and MITRE ATLAS.
- MCP Server Authentication: OAuth 2.1 for Remote Servers How OAuth 2.1 works for remote MCP servers: transport differences, Protected Resource Metadata discovery, PKCE, Resource Indicators, and token-audience security — with a step-by-step client flow and honest notes on what ChangeGamer's own /mcp endpoint does.
- Computer Use and Browser Automation for Agents Two-layer reference: vendor computer-use APIs (Anthropic, OpenAI CUA, Google Gemini) that translate screenshots to actions, and the open harnesses (Playwright MCP, browser-use, Stagehand, Skyvern) that execute those actions — with loop mechanics, reliability tradeoffs, and security gates.
- Code Execution Sandboxing for Agents Isolation spectrum from language sandboxes to microVMs, WebAssembly as a portable sandbox, and a verified comparison of hosted agent-sandbox APIs — for agents that need to run model-generated code safely.
- Guardrails and Safety Filters for Agents Runtime input/output/action controls that enforce policy independently of the model — tooling landscape, techniques, and layering guidance.
- Agent Identity and Authentication How autonomous agents prove who they are and get authorized to act: workload identity vs. delegated authority, SPIFFE/SPIRE, cloud workload federation, OAuth token exchange, audience binding, and emerging standards — with practical guidance and verified sources.
- Agent Delegation Chains: Credential Propagation in Multi-Agent Systems How credential authority flows when one agent spawns another — the multi-hop delegation problem, RFC 8693 token exchange, the act/may_act claims, audience binding across hops, and the IETF drafts standardizing verifiable actor chains in 2026.
- Text-to-SQL and Database Agents How agents answer questions over structured data by generating and executing SQL: schema context, few-shot prompting, self-correction, safety constraints, benchmarks (Spider, BIRD-SQL), and tooling (LangChain SQLDatabaseToolkit, LlamaIndex NLSQLTableQueryEngine, Vanna, MCP Postgres server).
- Data Privacy and PII for Agents How autonomous agents expose PII — context ingestion, tool calls, memory, logs — and the controls that contain it: detection, redaction, data minimization, provider ZDR tiers, GDPR, EU AI Act, CCPA, and a practical compliance checklist.
- Shipping AI Agents to Production: A Production-Readiness Checklist End-to-end checklist for productionizing an AI agent — evaluation gates, observability, guardrails, cost controls, resilience, durability, HITL approvals, secrets, rollback, and incident response.
- Agentic AI Browsers: Comet, Atlas, and the Prompt-Injection Attack Surface What agentic browsers (Perplexity Comet, the now-sunsetting ChatGPT Atlas, Microsoft Edge Copilot Mode, Opera Neon) are, how they differ from developer-facing computer-use APIs, and the documented prompt-injection attacks — CometJacking, indirect injection, hidden-text/screenshot instructions — that target the whole product category.
- Prompt Injection Design Patterns: Architectural Defenses for Agents Six named architectural patterns — Action-Selector, Plan-Then-Execute, LLM Map-Reduce, Dual LLM, Code-Then-Execute, Context-Minimization — plus Google DeepMind's CaMeL, that structurally constrain what an agent can do with untrusted data instead of just filtering it.
- AI Control for Agents: The Insider-Threat Defense Model What "AI control" means as a security paradigm distinct from alignment: Google DeepMind's Detection (D1-D4) and Prevention/Response (R1-R3) tiers for treating a deployed agent's own actions, not just its inputs, as the threat to defend against.
- Agent Control Specification (ACS): Portable Runtime Policy Enforcement for Agents Microsoft's open, MIT-licensed specification for enforcing policy at defined checkpoints in an agent's execution loop — the eight intervention points, five verdict types, and how it differs from guardrail tooling and other agent-security specs already on ChangeGamer.
- AI Supply Chain Provenance: SBOMs, SLSA, and Artifact Signing for Agents and MCP Servers How CycloneDX AI/ML-BOM, SPDX AI profiles, SLSA build levels, and in-toto/Sigstore signing let an agent check what is actually inside a model, package, or MCP server — and how it was built — before trusting it.
- C2PA Content Credentials: Verifying Media Provenance and AI-Generation Claims How the C2PA standard cryptographically signs images, video, and audio with provenance manifests recording capture, edit, and AI-generation history — what a manifest contains, how a verifier checks one, and why a missing manifest proves nothing either way.
- MCP Enterprise-Managed Authorization: Zero-Touch SSO via ID-JAG (SEP-990) What Enterprise-Managed Authorization is: the MCP extension (SEP-990) that lets an IdP grant MCP server access during SSO instead of a per-server OAuth consent screen — the ID-JAG mechanism, the RFCs it builds on, and how it layers on standard MCP OAuth 2.1.
Guides
- Fraud and Abuse from AI Agent Traffic: What a Seller Should Detect How a seller of APIs, content, or tools to AI agents spots and mitigates abuse once access is already granted — key sharing, over-scope scraping, spend-ceiling circumvention, spoofed identity, and rate-limit evasion patterns specific to autonomous agents.
- How to Implement OAuth 2.1 for an MCP Server A wire-level implementation walkthrough for OAuth 2.1 on a remote MCP server: what the discovery documents actually contain, CIMD vs. Dynamic Client Registration in your server code, per-SEP detail from the 2026-07-28 hardening set, and token-validation mechanics.
- Defending MCP Clients Against Tool Description and Output Injection Two distinct MCP injection surfaces — a tool description at connect-time and a tool's return value at call-time — and the client-side architectural patterns (Dual LLM, Action-Selector, Context-Minimization) that contain each one.
- Zero-Touch Enterprise Authorization for MCP Servers: ID-JAG and SEP-990 How Enterprise-Managed Authorization (SEP-990) removes the per-server OAuth consent screen for MCP servers: the ID-JAG grant mechanism, its RFC 8693/7523 building blocks, named launch adopters as of August 2026, and how it layers on top of standard OAuth 2.1 rather than replacing it.